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THE FUTURE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS
ACT OF 1789: LESSONS FROM IN RE
MARCOS HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
JOAN FTZPATRCK*

INTRODUCTION

On September 24, 1992, a federal civil jury in Honolulu rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the multidistrict human rights
litigation against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos and several of
his former associates and family members.' In re Marcos Human
Rights Litigation ("Marcos") is a milestone for the Alien Tort
Claims Act ("ATCA7) 2 for several reasons. First, Marcos was the
first human rights case brought under the ATCA to be fully contested in a trial on the merits, illustrating the numerous obstacles
that plaintiffs must overcome in proving human rights allegations. Second, Marcos was the first human rights case under the
ATCA to be decided by a jury, testing the ability and willingness
of ordinary Americans to provide redress for violations of fundamental human rights committed abroad. Third, Marcos was the
first human rights case under the ATCA to be brought as a class
action, presenting unique issues of proof, damages, and potential
divergence of priorities among victims, nongovernmental organizations and counsel.
The Ninth Circuit's October 1992 disposition of a separate appeal by Imee Marcos-Manotoc, from a default judgment entered
against her on behalf of the survivors of Archimedes Trajano,3
presents a challenging new view of the relevance of the Foreign
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Washington;
B.A., Rice University, J.D., Harvard Law School; Diploma in Law, Oxford University.
I would like to thank Dan Bodansky and Paul Hoffman for comments, the Ford Foundation and the University of Washington Law School Foundation for research support, and Matthew Miller for his fine research assistance.
1 In re Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, MDL No. 840 (D.Haw.
Sept. 24, 1992) [hereinafter Marcos]. For a discussion of the Marcos case, see Jury:
Marcos' Estate Liable for Atrocities, Cm. TRm., Sept. 25, 1992, at 18.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
3 In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Trajano v. Marcos and Marcos-Manotoc), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. deniedsub nom. Marcos-Manotoc v. Trajano,
113 S.Ct. 2960 (1993) [hereinafter Trajano 111.
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Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA7) 4 to suits against individual officials under the ATCA. Although foreign sovereign immunity
was rejected as a defense, the implications of the Trajano opinion
could lead to severe limits on jurisdiction under both the ATCA
and the recently enacted Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA7). 5
While these consequences might be avoided by the transplantation of the ultra vires/under color of law paradox 6 from constitutional tort doctrine into the realm of human rights litigation, that
already vexing doctrine presents additional difficulties in the international human rights context.
Two suits filed by Bosnian war victims against Radovan
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader,' present a key test for defining
the future scope of the ATCA. The Karadzic suits mark a new
stage in human rights litigation in United States courts, by attempting to confront gross violations of human rights while they
continue in a context of armed conflict. The Karadzic suits raise
additional noteworthy questions concerning immunity for quasistate actors and the human rights obligations of those without recognized official status.
I.

THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMs ACT OF

1789

The ATCA permits federal jurisdiction over suits by aliens
only for torts committed in violation of a treaty of the United
States or the law of nations. Although the reasons for its inclusion
in the Judiciary Act of 1789 remain unclear," Congress apparently
believed that the provision of remedies in federal court for aliens
victimized by violations of international law was an important aspect of the new republic's responsibilities as a member of the com4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1988).
5 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).

6 See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 363-64 (1991) (imposing personal liability on state official for federal civil rights violations for acts taken under color of state
law and within official's capacity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974)

(noting that Eleventh Amendment does not afford personal immunity for state official
who deprives claimant(s) of federal rights under color of state law); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing injunctions against state officials acting pursuant to
sovereign law, in violation of Constitution).
7 Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1993); Kadic v.
Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 2, 1993).
8 See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, FederalJurisdictionOver International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 54
n.3 (1981); Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Foundingof the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 62 (1988).
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munity of nations.9 The statute lapsed into disuse until the
1980s, when growing interest in the protection of human rights
and the emergence of advocates familiar with the body of international human rights law sparked a revival. While the number of
human rights cases brought under the ATCA remains modest,
each has significantly advanced the understanding of its scope
and possible barriers of immunity and nonjusticiability.
The "law of nations" referred to in the ATCA encompasses
norms of international human rights law whose breach would constitute a tort.10 Such norms include claims of summary execution,
disappearances, torture, and prolonged arbitrary detention, as alleged in the Marcos cases." Successful ATCA suits have involved
claims against former foreign state officials discovered by their
victims to have taken up residence in the United States, either
lawfully 12 or irregularly.' 3 Unsuccessful suits have sought re-

who were
dress directly from foreign states' 4 or from defendants
5
law.'
foreign
of
color
under
acting
clearly
not

9 Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 Ai. J. INrL L. 461, 475-80 (1989).
10 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 54 n.3, 88.
11 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (maintaining
wrongful death action under ATCA for death following kidnapping and torture); Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1535 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (bringing suit under ATCA
for torture, murder, and prolonged arbitrary detention), modified, 694 F. Supp. 707
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
12 Ferdinand Marcos asserted in portions of the litigation concerning his assets
that "it had not been his intention to go to Hawaii and that he had been taken there
involuntarily by the government of the United States." Republic of the Philippines v.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) [hereinafter Philippines11].
Kelbessa Negewo had obtained asylum status prior to being found liable for the
torture and arbitrary detention in Ethiopia of three plaintiffs, one of whom inadvertently discovered that he was employed at the same Atlanta hotel that she was.
Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, Civ. Action No. 1:90-cv-2010 GET (N.D. Ga., judgment filed
August 20, 1993).
13 Pena-Irala and Suarez-Mason were both found living as undocumented aliens
in the United States. Pena-Irala entered on a visitor's visa and remained beyond the
expiration date. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878-79. Suarez-Mason fled criminal prosecution in Argentina. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1536.
14 See, e.g., Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that
court lacked jurisdiction in claim against Soviet Union). But see Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that foreign state may
have waived sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
15 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
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From the outset of the revival of the ATCA about a decade ago
in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,'6 the propriety of the federal judiciary's
attempt to provide redress to victims of extraterritorial human
rights abuse has been challenged. The objections have been several. First, the competence of the federal courts to determine the
substantive scope of international human rights law has been
doubted, sometimes reflecting deeper doubt whether any such law
exists. 17 Second, skepticism has been voiced whether those norms
may be legally enforced in the context of domestic litigation, in the
absence of specific implementing legislation. 18 Third, the hypothetical danger of retaliation by means of suits in foreign countries against United States officials has been cited as a reason for
the courts to decline jurisdiction until more clearly commanded by
Congress to act.' 9 Fourth, the constitutionality of conferring jurisdiction over suits between aliens for violations of the law of nations has been questioned. 20 Finally, the dominance by the political branches over foreign policy has been deemed responsible for
an exceedingly cautious approach by the courts to ATCA suits, especially those brought against an exiled dictator or other leading
figure whose presence in the United States is explained by a policy
objective of the Executive. 2 ' These concerns figured at various
points in the Marcos litigation, though ultimately none served as a
bar to adjudication.

16 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
17 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to argue
over what is or what is not an accepted violation of the law of nations ....
The typical judge or jury would be swamped in citations to various distinguished journals of international legal studies, but would be left with little
more than a numbing sense of how varied is the world of public international
"law."
Id.
18 Id. at 816-19 (Bork, J., concurring); Philip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 692 n.98 (1986) (citing differences
between international and United States law as to effective date of treaty).
19 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-2448,
1989 WL 79894 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989) (reported in table at 878 F.2d 1438).
20 Trajano II, 978 F.2d at 501-02.
21 See Peter E. Bass, Note: Ex-Head of State Immunity:A ProposedStatutory Tool
of ForeignPolicy, 97 YALE L.J. 299 (1987) (suggesting limited immunity from suit for
ex-heads of state brought into United States for policy reasons).
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II. IN RE AARCOS HUMAN RIGHTS -ITIGATION- CiASs ACTION
JURY TRIAL

In re Marcos Human Rights Litigationconsolidated five separate civil suits originally filed in three different judicial districts
shortly after Ferdinand Marcos was forced into exile in Hawaii by
the popular reaction to his purported re-election to the presidency.2 2 In Sison v. Marcos, Florentina Sison, Ramon Sison, and
Jose Maria Sison alleged the disappearance of Francisco Sison
(son of Florentina and brother of Ramon and Jose Maria) and the
23
torture and prolonged arbitrary detention of Jose Maria Sison.
Jaime Piopongco, a United States citizen, joined the suit alleging
assault, arrest, torture, and seizure of his radio station. In
Trajanov. Marcos, the mother of Archimedes Trajano alleged that
her son had been arrested, tortured, and murdered by security
agents acting at the behest of Imee Marcos-Manotoc, whom he had
questioned at a university meeting. 24 Hilao v. Marcos was a class
action of Philippine torture and summary execution victims. 2 5 Or-

tigas v. Marcos and Clemente v. Marcos were actions filed by two
groups of plaintiffs who were victims of arbitrary detention and, in
some cases, torture.26
All five suits were dismissed on act of state grounds by district courts in Hawaii27 and California. 28 Ruling on all five cases
22 Hilao v. Marcos, No. CV-86-390-HMF (D.Haw. filed June 3, 1986) (originally
filed in March 1986, E.D. Pa., but transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631); Sison v.
Marcos, No. CV-86-225-HMF (D.Haw. filed Mar. 26, 1986); Clemente v. Marcos, No.
CV-86-1449-SW (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 20, 1986); Trajano v. Marcos, No. CV-86-207HMF (D. Haw. filed Mar. 20, 1986); Ortigas v. Marcos, No. CV-86-975-SW (N.D. Cal.

filed Mar. 4, 1986).
23 Sison v. Marcos, Co. CV-86-225-HMF (D. Haw. filed Mar. 26, 1986). Jose Maria Sison was a prominent dissident imprisoned without charge from 1977 to 1986. Id.
Francisco Sison was a government economics official who disappeared on a day in
1971 when he was scheduled to attend a luncheon meeting at Malacanang Palace in
Manila. Id.
24 Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207 (D.Haw. filed Mar. 20, 1986) [hereinafter
Trajano].
25 Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-2448, 1989 WL 76894, *1 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989)

(reported in table at 878 F.2d 1438) [hereinafter Trajano 1I.
26 Id.
27 Hilao, Sison,

and Trajano were dismissed on act of state grounds by Judge
Harold Fong on July 18, 1986. Id. at *1-2. On May 29, 1986, a default judgment had
been entered against Imee Marcos-Manotoc in Trajano,when she failed to enter an
appearance in the case. Id. In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Trajano v. Marcos
and Marcos-Manotoc), 978 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
Marcos-Manotoc v. Trajano, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993). Marcos-Manotoc filed a motion to
set aside this default on March 25, 1991 (No. 86-207-HMF). Id. The motion was de-

496

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:491

in a brief unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissals.2 9 On remand, the cases were consolidated for trial in the
District of Hawaii by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.3 °
The act of state defense requires brief discussion as background to the command responsibility issues in the Marcos trial
and the determination of the FSIA issue in the Trajano appeal.
The two district courts had rested their dismissals on the premise
that all of Marcos's acts had been undertaken pursuant to his
powers as President of the Philippines, that adjudication of the
claims would require inquiry into the legality of those acts under
international and Philippine law, and that such adjudication
would risk the embarrassment and interference with foreign relations that the act of state doctrine was intended to prevent.3 1
nied and judgment was entered against her on May 13, 1991. Id. Marcos-Manotoc's
appeal was rejected by the Ninth Circuit on October 21, 1992. Id.
28 Ortigas and Clemente were dismissed on January 22, 1987, by Judge Spencer
Williams of the Northern District of California. TrajanoI, 1989 WL 76894 at *2.
29 Id.
30 MDL No. 840, Order of September 13, 1989. The cases were assigned to Judge
Manuel Real. Id.
31 Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207. (D. Haw. filed Mar 20, 1986). In dismissing the three cases before him, Judge Fong of the District of Hawaii made the
following observations:
To sustain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the plaintiffs must allege
that the tortious acts were official acts or acts committed under color of law
.... This theory of recovery requires precisely the type of inquiry in which
the federal courts have refused to engage under the act of state doctrine ....
For purposes of arguing that jurisdiction existed under § 1350, Marcos' actions were characterized as a "systematic governmental operation to suppress dissent." In contrast, when the act of state arose, this case was characterized as one involving "discrete violations" of international human rights.
Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. However Marcos' acts are characterized,
it is clear that this case would require examination of official policies of the
Marcos administration. Regardless of the semantics, these cases would still
involve judicial review of the acts of the duly recognized head of a foreign
sovereign committed under authority of law. Such cases have long been considered non-justiciable under the act of state doctrine.
Id.
Judge Williams noted "the turmoil in the Philippines, the role of the Reagan Administration in the exit and current status of Mr. Marcos, and the continuing importance of the Philippine nation to U.S. interests" and "the potential for interference in
foreign relations" in invoking the act of state doctrine. Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 860207 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie). Brief for Appellee
Ferdinand E. Marcos at 12, Hilao v. Marcos, Nos. 86-2449, 86-2496, 86-2448, 87-1706,
87-1707 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 26, 1987).
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The act of state doctrine, broadly applied, would swallow up
much of the ATCA and all of the TVPA.3 2 Human rights violations within the scope of the "law of nations" generally may be
committed only by those exercising power conferred on them by
the state,33 since human rights law primarily imposes obligations
upon states. This is especially true of the TVPA, which permits
actions only for torture and extrajudicial killing, defined specifically to require a showing that the torts were inflicted "under color
of foreign law."34 If every tortious act is per se an act of state (and
thus nonactionable) when committed by a foreign official, then
neither the ATCA nor the TVPA can serve as vehicles for classic
human rights violations such as those alleged in Marcos.
The Ninth Circuit, reversing the dismissals of the five Marcos
suits, avoided this undesirable result, but failed to grapple with
the crucial issues. The unpublished decision relied primarily upon
the rejection of Marcos's act of state defense in Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,3 5 a civil action to recover assets embezzled by
Marcos during his presidential tenure. Republic of Philippines
had rested on several compelling grounds: (1) the foreign state
whose "embarrassment" was "at risk" in the adjudication was the
plaintiff itself;36 (2) the United States government suggested that
the act of state doctrine did not apply in the circumstances;3 7 and
(3) the conduct at issue, embezzlement of state assets, was more
personal than sovereign in nature38 and thus, not really an act of
"state" meriting insulation from review by a United States court.3 9
The Ninth Circuit, comparing the consolidated Marcos actions
to Republic of Philippines, found "no material distinctions between these cases ...

."40

The human rights suits focused on

Marcos's abuse of his coercive power as a government leader to
oppress his subjects violently to preserve his political hegemony,
while the assets litigation concerned personal monetary gain. The
32 See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights Law in
United States Courts:A ComparativePerspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-18 (1992).
33 See infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text (discussing Karadzic suits).
34 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
35 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988).
36

Id.

37 Id. at 1361.
38 Id. (citing Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied
sub nom., Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1963)). Jimenez concerned the embezzlement of state assets by a deposed Venezuelan ruler. Jimenez, 311 F.2d at 547.
39 PhilippinesII, 862 F.2d at 1360-61.
40 Trajano I, 1989 WL 76894 at *2.
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Ninth Circuit's implicit ruling that this distinction is not "material" may indicate that gross human rights violations, just like
looting the national treasury, are acts that cannot reasonably be
attributable to the state.
Such an approach could constitute the basis for a judicially
crafted ultra vires exception to the act of state doctrine. 4 1 As
Judge Sofaer noted in Sharon v. Time, Inc., "actions of an official
acting outside the scope of his authority as an agent of the state
are simply not acts of state. In no sense are such acts designed to
give effect to a State's public interests."4 2 The Ninth Circuit, however, declined to develop this theory, and rather seemed driven
primarily by the attitudes of political actors, the United States
and current Philippine governments, neither of which had raised
the act of state or other objections to the justiciability of the
human rights claims.4 s
Once the barrier of act of state had fallen, the Marcos cases
proceeded to trial. Although a head of state immunity claim had
been raised initially by Marcos, on the premise that he rather
than Corazon Aquino was the de jure head of the Philippine government," this claim disappeared early in the litigation. Former
head of state immunity was not recognized as a barrier to
justiciability.4 5
With Judge Real exercising a tight rein over the proceedings,
the five consolidated cases concerning the claims of approximately
10,000 human rights victims were tried in a two-week period.
While many victims of torture and arbitrary detention were present to testify in detail about their individual trauma, and in some
cases to relate Marcos's personal involvement in their suffer41 The issue was thoroughly briefed by counsel for Sison. Brief of Appellants, at
13-28, in Trajano I (No. 86-2448).
42 599 F. Supp. 538, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (libel suit by Israeli official concerning
allegations of his complicity in massacres).
43 Trajano I, 1989 WL 76894 at *2. Harold Koh has noted the retreat of the
courts from their own autonomous determination of international law issues toward a
posture of greater deference to the wishes of the Executive, dating from the 1930s and
1940s. Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublicLaw Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,

2357 (1991).
44 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Ferdinand Marcos' Motion to Dismiss, at 4-9 in Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207 (D. Haw., filed Apr. 10,
1986).
45 See Estate of Domingo v. Republic of Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D.
Wash. 1988) (holding that former head of state immunity was no barrier to
justiciability).
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ings,4 6 claims of disappearances rested largely on circumstantial
evidence. With respect to the class members who were not named
plaintiffs, torture and arbitrary detention allegations required the
jury to base its verdict on an assumption that, given the proven
violations, thousands of similar violations more likely than not occurred. This extrapolation was supported in large part by the testimony of human rights monitors representing international and
national nongovernmental organizations, whose fact-finding
methods were criticized by lawyers for Marcos as insufficient to
meet the burden of proof in civil litigation. 47
One of the greatest challenges was establishing the responsibility of Marcos himself. In the cross-examination of Michael Posner, head of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, counsel
for Marcos questioned whether Marcos "sanctioned" the abuses or
simply failed to prevent or stop them.4 8 Posner replied that since
Marcos "had to an unusual degree taken central control of the judicial, legislative and military powers of government" during the
law period he was responsible for the continuing violamartial
tions. 49 Marcos's failure to undertake serious investigations of
claims of human rights violations was also stressed as evidence of
Marcos's complicity in the particular abuses. As American Civil
Liberties Union attorney Paul Hoffman argued with respect to the
disappearance of Francisco Sison, "the absence of any investigation speaks volumes about Ferdinand Marcos' responsibility because he didn't investigate the disappearance of one of his own
high officials.... [Y]ou don't need to investigate when you know
what happened.""0
In his instructions to the jury, Judge Real noted that both direct ordering of and the failure to take effective measures to prevent torture, summary execution or disappearance were sufficient
bases for Marcos's liability:
Jose Maria Sison was taken to meet Marcos personally within 12 hours of his
arrest and had various emissaries sent to him in his prison cell by Marcos throughout
his nine-year detention. Transcript of Trial Sept. 22, 1992, at 29-31, Marcos, MDL.
No. 840 (D. Haw.).
47 See, e.g., cross-examination of Diane Orentlicher, Transcript of Trial, Sept. 17,
1992, at 17-23, Marcos (MDL No. 840).
48 Transcript of Trial, Sept. 15, 1992, at 6, Marcos (MDL No. 840).
49 Id. Posner was asked about 1984 Senate testimony in which he asserted that
he had no information that Marcos was "ordering abuses to take place." Id. at 7.
50 Transcript of Trial, Sept. 22, 1992, at 27, Marcos (MDL No. 840).
46
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You may find the defendant Estate liable to plaintiffs if you
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ferdinand Marcos
acting under color of law either (1) directed, ordered, conspired
with or aided Philippine military, paramilitary and/or intelligence forces to torture, summarily execute or cause the disappearance of plaintiffs and the class or (2) had knowledge that
Philippine military, paramilitary and/or intelligence forces tortured, summarily executed, caused the disappearance of, or arbitrary detention [of] plaintiffs and the class, and having the5 1power
failed to take effective measures to prevent the practice.
In the Marcos case, the plaintiffs presented two kinds of evidence: the direct, detailed and individualized testimony of the
surviving victims themselves; and oral versions of human rights
fact-finding reports, presented through witnesses from nongovernmental organizations involved in monitoring human rights abuses
during the Marcos era, along with the testimony of State Department witnesses regarding their own contacts with Marcos and
their knowledge of human rights conditions in the Philippines
during his regime." The former type of evidence is unremarkable
in a civil tort action, aside from the unusual locale of the events
recounted and the atrocious nature of the injuries described. The
latter type of evidence seems less familiar in the courtroom setting, and became the subject of close questioning by defense counsel with respect to potential witness bias and flaws in fact-finding
methodology.5 3 To succeed in a class action, where the stories of a
few individuals must embody the experiences of a large number,
general reporting of patterns of human rights abuse is a virtual
necessity. Without it, the jury would have difficulty concluding
that a class of similar victims exists and merits compensation.
As Harold Koh has remarked, "transnational public law [suits
seek] redress, deterrence, and reform of national governmental
54
policies through clarification of rules of international conduct."
The goals of plaintiffs in ATCA suits are multiple:
[Although transnational public law plaintiffs routinely request
retrospective damages or even prospective injunctive relief, their
Jury Instructions at 10, Marcos (MDL No. 840).
Witnesses included Sister Mariani of Task Force Detainees and Diane Orentlicher and Michael Posner of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, as well as
former State Department officials Charles Salmon, Stephen Bosworth and Stephen
Cohen.
53 See supra notes 47-52.
54 Koh, supra note 43, at 2348.
51
52
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broader strategic goals are often served by a declaratory or default judgment announcing that a transnational norm has been
violated. Even a judgment that the plaintiff cannot enforce
against the defendant in the rendering forum empowers the
plaintiff by creating a bargaining chip for use in other political
fora.
[AIRl tort judgments, whether domestic or transnational,
serve several ends: compensation for victims; denial of safe haven to the defendant in the judgment-rendering forum; deterrence of others who might contemplate similar conduct; and
enunciation of legal norms opposing the conduct for which the
defendant has been found liable. .. . [N]orm-enunciation, deterrence, and denial of safe haven assume greater prominence in a
transnational setting, where highly mobile defendants and the
absence of full faith and credit impair the collectability of
judgments. 5
Given these largely abstract and normative aims of ATCA litigation, the logic of proceeding by class action is not obvious. It is
striking that the nongovernmental human rights organizations involved in the Marcostrial, the American Civil Liberties Union and
Human Rights Watch, represented a relatively small group of four
plaintiffs.56 It has been the tradition of human rights groups such
as Amnesty International to focus upon the stories of individual
victims, to put a human face upon violations that might otherwise
seem too abstract and remote to engage public attention. Quantification of the scope of human rights violations, while important in
some circumstances, 5 7 can diminish the impact of human rights
reporting by diverting public attention from the outrageousness of
the abuse to the accuracy of the numerical data. s
For personal injury lawyers,5 9 ideological objectives may
carry less force. The class device has well established attractions
Id. at 2349 n.11.
The clients were three members of the Sison family and Jaime Piopongco.
Trajano I, 1989 WL 76894 at *1.
57 ECOSOC Resolution 1503, for example, provides a complaint procedure for
"consistent pattern[s] of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1
(1970). See generally Symposium: StatisticalIssues in the Field of Human Rights, 8
Hum. RTS. Q. 551, 551-699 (1986).
58 For example, Aryeh Neier of Human Rights Watch wrote a piece attacking the
accuracy of the reporting by other human rights groups of the number of rapes of
Bosnian Muslim women. THE NATION, Mar. 1, 1993, at 259.
59 Well-kmown lawyer Melvin Belli was among the counsel for the larger groups
of plaintiffs in Marcos. Marcos, MDL No. 840.
55
56
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for litigation cost-sharing and diminution of the risk of
nonrecovery, especially with respect to mass torts. Patterns of
gross human rights violations can be approached in litigation as
"disasters" akin to airplane crashes or products liability crises.
Among ATCA cases, Marcos presented an unusually great possibility that a judgment for money damages might ultimately be executed. As a result, the damages issue became especially nettlesome. 60 Human rights groups in the Philippines might
plausibly prefer to use the Marcos assets for program building to
prevent ongoing or future deprivations of rights in that still-volatile country. Moreover, the Philippine government actively seeks
to recover Marcos's assets as the ill-gotten gains of illegal corruption.61 Nevertheless, the Philippine government consistently refused to interpose objections to the ATCA litigation and recently
announced that it would not assert precedence over human rights
claims.62
Human rights organizations, with their commitment to institution-building to prevent future violations, may sympathize with
the efforts of national human rights groups and newly democratic
governments to gain access to the assets of a fallen dictator, and
find the "people's" entitlement more weighty than that of the individuals who participated as plaintiffs in the ATCA action. The attitude of personal injury counsel cannot realistically be expected
to be the same.
Human rights lawyers face many of the same dilemmas as
lawyers engaged in other areas of public interest law, in discharging their duty of loyalty to their clients while promoting the public
values that constitute the heart of their mission.63 As David
Luban has cogently demonstrated,6 4 traditional notions of client
60 Class members had until July 31, 1993 to file claims with the court; as of July
10, however, only 2,000 of 10,000 potential claimants had fied for damages. Only
2,000 of 10,000 Victims of Marcos Regime File for Damages, Agence France Presse,
July 11, 1993, availablein LEXIS, Nexis library, AFP file. Lawyers for the class have
indicated that they would request three million dollars for each deceased victim and
two million dollars for each victim of torture. Id.
61 See, e.g., PhilippinesII, 862 F.2d at 1357-58.
62 See Manila to Share MarcosLoot with Rights Victims, Reuter Library Report,
May 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter file.
63 See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in ClassActions, 34 STAN. L. REV.1183
(1982). Rhode notes that conflicts among class members and between class members
and counsel frequently emerge during the settlement or remedial phases of the litigation. Id. at 1188-89.
64 DAVID LuBAN,LAWYERs AND JusTIcE 324-57 (1988). Luban suggests four models for devising strategy in public interest class actions: (1) the direct delegation
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control and loyalty must give way where the public interest lawyer and client are colleagues in an ideological struggle.
But it is not clear whether Marcos's victims more resemble
the ideologically motivated plaintiffs in desegregation suits, or the
compensation-seeking victims of an ordinary tort. In situations of
gross human rights violations, some victims' political beliefs are
the magnet for their victimization, which in turn reinforces their
ideological commitment. Random or mistaken victimization can
radicalize additional victims, providing an ideological impulse to
enter the litigation. But other random targets of repression may
focus on their individual trauma without being ideologically transformed, behaving like typical mass tort victims in seeing individual compensation as their highest, if not sole, priority. While
many ATCA suits have involved the kind of lawyer/client solidarity that is the premise of Luban's theory, class actions managed by
personal injury lawyers do not fit his paradigm. As a result, conflicts within the class may be less easily resolved.6 5
III. IMMUNITY IssuEs IN Y'RAjANO: IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC AS
THE STATE

In March 1986 Agapita Trajano, a Philippine citizen residing
in Hawaii, filed suit against Imee Marcos-Manotoc, her father
Ferdinand Marcos, and former military intelligence chief Fabian
Ver in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. 66 Trajano alleged that her son, Archimedes Trajano, a student at the Mapua Institute of Technology, had been seized on August 31, 1977, tortured for a period of twelve to thirty-six hours
and killed by police and military intelligence personnel acting
under Marcos-Manotoc's orders. Archimedes Trajano had attended a public meeting at which Marcos-Manotoc had spoken,
and had questioned her concerning her appointment as the director of a government-sponsored organization.6 7 Although Ferdimodel, where the class is small and able to convey its wishes to the lawyers; (2) the
indirect delegation model, where the class picks the named plaintiffs who then direct
the lawyers; (3) the interest representation model, where the class is "unmobilized
and the lawyers take cues from class members who seem to be representative; and (4)
best-world representation, in which the lawyers strive to create the best possible
world for present and future class members, largely by making unilateral strategic
decisions. Id. at 351-52.
65 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
66 Trajano II, 978 F.2d at 496.
67 Answering Brief for the Appellees, Trajano (No. 91-15891).
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nand Marcos actively contested the court's jurisdiction, Imee
Marcos-Manotoc did not enter an appearance and default judgment was entered against her after she had left the United States.
68
The court awarded damages in excess of four million dollars.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Marcos-Manotoc argued that
the suit was barred by foreign sovereign immunity. A "foreign

state" is defined in section 1603(b) of the FSIA as including "an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."69 Whether individual foreign officials fit within section 1603(b) is a question of potentially great moment in ATCA and TVPA litigation, though
Trajano is the first such case to require its decision.
Several courts have explicitly or implicitly held that an individual official is not an "agency or instrumentality" entitled to foreign sovereign immunity under section 1603(b). In Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos, ° the Solicitor General of the Philippines
sought to quash a subpoena served on him by Ferdinand Marcos
while the official was in the United States on official business.
The United States government filed a "Suggestion of Immunity"
requesting that the district court defer to its determination that
the official should enjoy immunity under the FSIA. 71 The district
court refused, finding that the plain meaning and the legislative
history72 of the statute excluded individual officials from the definition of a sovereign, 73 further noting that the government's reTrajanoII, 978 F.2d at 496 n.4.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988).
665 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Id. at 795.
The House Report on the FSIA discusses the "agency or instrumentality" language purely in terms of artificial entities and not natural persons. H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614. The Report
states that § 1603(b) "is intended to include a corporation, association, foundation, or
any other entity which, under the law of the foreign state where it was created, can
sue or be sued in its own name..." and that § 1603(b)(2) "requires that the entity be
either an organ of a foreign state.., or that a majority of the entity's shares or other
ownership interest be owned by a foreign state. .. ." Id. at 15, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613-14. The Report further states:
As a general matter, entities which meet the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" could assume a variety of forms, including a
state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such
as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency or a department or ministry
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614. At no point is the possibility of a
natural person being such an agency or instrumentality mentioned.
73 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinafter Philippines11.
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quest for deference to its recommendation was directly contrary to
the prime aim of the FSIA-to codify sovereign immunity and
transform it into an issue for judicial resolution rather than executive discretion.7 4 The Solicitor General, however, received diplomatic immunity.7
A claim of sovereign immunity for Ferdinand Marcos was rejected by the Second Circuit in a different phase of the assets litigation, without extensive discussion.7 6 Manuel Noriega's request
for sovereign immunity from prosecution likewise was rejected,
but without close analysis of the FSIA text or legislative history.7 7
Yet when Imee Marcos-Manotoc raised the claim of sovereign
immunity, it had surface plausibility because of precedent established in yet another Marcos-related case. In Chuidian v. Philippine NationalBank,78 Vincente Chuidian sued Raul Daza, a member of the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
established by Corazon Aquino to recover the "ill-gotten wealth"
which Marcos had amassed.7 9 During the Marcos period,
Chuidian had been engaged in litigation in a California court with
the state-owned Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation, which resulted in his receipt of an irrevocable letter
of credit from the institution as settlement. The Commission suspected that the settlement had been engineered to conceal
Marcos's corrupt relationship with Chuidian's businesses, and
Daza ordered that the letter of credit not be honored. Chuidian
sued in state court on the letter of credit, and the institution removed the suit to federal court.8 0 Chuidian then joined Daza as a
party defendant, alleging interference with contractual relations.
The United States government filed a statement of interest in
Chuidian,1 this time asserting that as an individual Daza was
not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA because he
74

Id. at 796-97.

75 Id. at 799-800.
76 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that sovereign immunity would not extend to former head of state and that alternatively appellants, Marcos's business associates, lacked standing to raise claim) [hereinafter Philippines].
77 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519-23 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
78 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
79 Id. at 1097.
80 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1973 & Supp. 1993) (permitting removal by agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns).
81 This statement of interest thus differed from that filed in PhilippinesI, 665 F.
Supp. at 793.
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was not an "agency or instrumentality."8 2 Instead, the government urged the court to apply general principles of sovereign immunity, as reflected in the Restatement (Second)ForeignRelations
Law of the United States. 3 The Chuidian court rejected that argument 4 on grounds that the FSIA provides the exclusive basis
for the recognition of claims of sovereign immunity, which must be
determined by the courts and not by executive advice.8 5
But there Republic of Philippinesand Chuidianpart company
dramatically. While conceding that the argument that individuals
are not encompassed in the FSIA "draws some significant support
from the legislative history of section 1603(b)" 6 and that "the Act
is ambiguous as to its extension to individual foreign officials,"8 7
the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian chose to extend sovereign immunity
to individuals.
The court justified this holding on grounds that failing to do
so would mark a departure from common law that could not rea88
sonably be attributed to the Congress that enacted the FSIA.
The court noted other cases reading the FSIA to extend sovereign
immunity to individual officials, without examining the shallow
analysis of those holdings.8 9 The Ninth Circuit buttressed its
82 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1099.
83 The second edition of the RESTATEMENT provided that sovereign immunity

could be extended to any official of a foreign state with respect to acts performed in an
official capacity, if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law
against the state. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 66(e). However, no such provision exists in the third edition, in light of the
codification of different principles of sovereign immunity in the 1976 FSIA. See
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1099-1101 (reviewing RESTATEmENT (THmD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)).
84 The reasoning resembled that of the District Court in PhilippinesI, 665 F.
Supp. at 793.
85 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
86 Id. at 1100-01 (quoting passages from House Report on FSIA); see also supra
note 72.
87 Chuidian, 912 F.2d. at 1101.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1103. The notion that natural persons are "agencies or instrumentalities" under § 1603(b) of the FSIA apparently was first accepted in Rios v. Marshall,
530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A complex antitrust and civil rights action by
American farm workers against numerous apple and sugar cane growers and federal
and state officials, Rios also involved claims against the government of Jamaica, the
British West Indies Central Labour Organization ("BWICLO," a labor recruitment
consortium funded by 12 West Indian governments) and Harold Edwards, BWICLO's
chief liaison officer in the United States. Id. at 371. The claims against Jamaica,
BWICLO and Edwards were all dismissed under the FSIA. Id. at 372-73. The totality of the discussion of Edwards' immunity is the coures statement, "insofar as Ed-
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broad reading of section 1603(b) through reliance on immunity

doctrines which establish that "official capacity" suits brought
against state and local officials in the United States are considered suits against the sovereign. ° The court sweepingly rejected
Chuidian's claim that Daza had acted for malicious reasons and,
thus, ultra vires.9 1 Noting that since Daza's order to stop payment
on the letter of credit was possible only by virtue of his power as a
member of the Commission, the court held Daza was by definition
acting in his official capacity.9 2 He was thus immune from suit
regardless of motive or abuse of authority. 93
There is no recognition in Chuidian of the consequences to
human rights suits of this reading of the FSIA. Because "color of
law" requirements are essential to make out many violations of
human rights norms, including protections against summary execution, torture, and arbitrary detention, a broad Chuidian approach would render the ATCA a dead letter for all but piracytype cases. Since Congress failed to address extraterritorial
wards is sued in his official capacity as agent of the instrumentality, he is equally
protected by principles of foreign sovereign immunity." Id. at 371. In dictum concerning BWICLO's act of state defense, however, the court found the doctrine inapplicable
because BWICLO's acts were not "pursuant to a particular, formal edict or resolution
. " Id. at 371 n.22.
Rios was followed without serious discussion in two other cases. In Mueller v.
Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513 (CBM), 1983 WL 25419 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983), a libel
suit against the judges and clerks of a Swiss court was dismissed on FSIA grounds on
the basis of a bare citation to Rios. The same holding without reasoning was made in
American Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp.
861, 863 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (employees of Air France "sued in their respective capacities
as employees of Air France, are also protected by the FSIA--but not immune under
commercial activity exception of § 1605(a)(2)).
In Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), Rios was again
reflexively followed, though the court explicitly noted and rejected the contrary ruling
in Republic. One of the Kline defendants was the Mexican Secretary of Government
(Manuel Bartlett Diaz), who was alleged to have illegally expelled Kline from Mexico
as part of a conspiracy concerning the supply of steel pipes to Pemex, the Mexican
petroleum company. 685 F. Supp. at 388-89. Also named as a defendant was Paloma
Cordero de la Madrid, wife of the Mexican President. Id. at 388. Bartlett Diaz'immunity was said to rest on whether he had acted in his official capacity, and "Kline's
assertion that she was not accorded due process is in no way inconsistent with Bartlett Diaz having acted in his official capacity." Id. at 390. Cordero de Ia Madrid was
not protected by the FSIA since she "has no official role or duties," but since the parties were not diverse and the claims were based on state law, the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims against her. Id. at 392.
90 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101-02.
91 Id. at 1106-07.
92 Id. at 1106.
93 Id.
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human rights torts specifically in the FSIA, suits against individual officials for foreign acts of torture would suffer the same fate of
dismissal on the pleadings as ATCA suits naming foreign states.94
Chuidian's analogy to "official capacity" suits against state
and federal officials is misleading, since sovereign immunity in
that context is moderated by important qualifications and fictions.
Ex parte Young 95 permits federal injunctions to restrain state officials from acting in violation of the Constitution, on the theory
that they have no discretion to do so. 9 6 They are stripped of their

official capacity when so acting, even when they are faithfully applying their sovereign's law. 97 Hafer v. Melo 98 clarifies that damages suits can be brought against state officials on the fiction of
suing them in their "personal capacity," even though the claim requires proof that the official was acting under color of state law in
committing the constitutional tort.99 The courts accept the inherent contradictions of these immunity doctrines for the sake of
striking a balance between the legitimate interests of the sovereign and the compelling need of the victims of constitutional torts
for redress. Without these fictions, sovereign immunity would
make constitutional protections illusory.
Chuidian strikes no such balance for human rights victims.
The starkness of its principle is well-illustrated in Herbage v.
Meese. 100 Herbage had been extradited to the United States from
the United Kingdom. 10 1 He alleged that he had been the victim of
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
95 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
96 Id. at 159.
97 This point was raised in Justice Harlan's dissent in Ex parte Young, emphasizing the fact that Attorney General Young acted within the scope of his official duties
and that states can only act through their agents. Id. at 182-204.
98 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991).
99 Were the damages action to be brought against a state official in her official
capacity, it would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which provides that "[t]he
Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). Even federal injunction suits against
state officials acting in their official capacity are regarded as suits virtually against
the state and thus presumptively barred by the Eleventh Amendment; that bar falls
only where the federal cause of action is based on an alleged violation of the Constitution under the fiction of Ex parte Young or where the state has waived or Congress
has abrogated its immunity. See Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 102.
100 747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
101 Id. at 62.
94
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a violation of the specialty clause 0 2 of the extradition treaty and
that various British officials had deprived him of procedural
10 3
rights guaranteed by the treaty during his extradition hearing.
His suit against the British officials was dismissed on sovereign
immunity grounds. 10

Herbage argued that when the sovereign's

agents act illegally they do not enjoy the sovereign's immunity because the sovereign has not authorized them to so act. 10 5
Herbage's theory has a formidable pedigree, with roots in
cases dating to the fifteenth century, recognition by Blackstone
and the status of being "so well settled [by the nineteenth century]
as to not require the citation of authority." 0 6 Yet the district
court flatly rejected Herbage's argument and any notion of an ultra vires limit on sovereign immunity for individual officials,
holding:
[T]hese men were acting in their official capacities as agents of
the British government... those actions cannot and do not subject them to liability in the courts of the United States....
The FSIA is absolute in this regard, no matter how heinous the
alleged illegalities. The Court has no authority to address the
legality of the defendants' actions .... Herbage's arguments are
unavailing. The basis of this type of immunity doctrine is to prointo the sphere of
tect the executive prerogative and not to enter
07
relations between sovereign states: comity.
Poorly reasoned and potentially disastrous from a human rights
perspective, Herbage was nevertheless summarily affirmed by the
District of Columbia Circuit.' 0 8 Even more chilling, Herbage was
cited with apparent approval in Justice Souter's majority opinion
in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,'0 9 for the proposition that acts of
wrongful arrest, arbitrary detention, and torture are "peculiarly
sovereign in nature,""10 and thus especially likely to be immune
under the FSJA.
102 Id. The doctrine of specialty provides that a prisoner extradited to stand trial
on one charge cannot be tried by the receiving state on a different charge. See United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886).
103 Herbage, 747 F. Supp. at 62-63.
104 Id. at 65-68.
105 Id. at 67.
106 Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 142-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Herbage, 747 F. Supp. at 67.
108 Herbage v. Meese, 946 F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
109 113 S. Ct 1471, 1480 (1993), vacated, 996 F.2d 270 (11th Cir. 1993).
110 Id. at 1479.
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As the Supreme Court noted in Amerada Hess, the ATCA "of
course has the same effect after the passage of the FSIA as before
with respect to defendants other than foreign states."11 ' The
question is who these defendants may be. Are all foreign officials
who commit human rights violations under color of foreign law
encompassed within section 1603(b) of the FSIA? Are former as
well as current officials immunized? If so, the Supreme Court's
observation in Amerada Hess that the defendant in Filartigawas
a police official rather than "the Paraguayan Government" would
be rather pointless.1 12
In the Trajano appeal, the Ninth Circuit failed to probe these
questions adequately, holding that the argument that the FSIA
does not extend to individual officials was "foreclosed by
Chuidian." 3 Trajano's counsel urged that acts of torture and arbitrary killing are by definition beyond the scope of any official's
1 14
duties and thus cannot be immunized under the FSIA.
Reaching an assertedly "easy"115 result, the Ninth Circuit focused upon the fact that Marcos-Manotoc had defaulted. By so
doing, she had conceded that she had acted in her personal capacity and "not on the authority of the Republic of the Philippines." 1 6
Judge Rymer observed in Trajano that this disposition is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the act of state defense,
because that holding "implicitly rejected the possibility that the
acts set out in Trajano's complaint were public acts of the sovereign." ' 17 While this is true, Judge Rymer did not acknowledge
that the degree of flexibility a court has to modify the act of state
doctrine, to achieve an appropriate balance between the interests
of the foreign state and those of the litigants, may be quite different from that enjoyed by courts applying the FSIA, especially in
8
light of the rigid literalism of Amerada Hess."
Strong evidence of this possible lack of interpretive flexibility
is found in Judge Fletcher's reluctant rejection in Siderman de
111 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).
112 Id. at 436 n.4.
113 Trajano II, 978 F.2d at 497 n.8. The argument had been presented by amici
Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and Human Rights Watch. Id.
114 Answering Brief for Appellees, Trajano II (No. 91-15891) at 33-35.
115 Trajano II, 978 F.2d at 498.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 498 n.10.
118 488 U.S. 428, 433-35 (1989) (FSIA sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign state in U.S. courts); see supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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Blake v. Republic of Argentina'1 9 of an implicitjus cogens exception to the FSIA, an exception equally premised on a theory that
sovereigns lack discretion to commit gross violations of customary
human rights law. 120 Arguably, the codified exceptions to the
FSIA are themselves designed to indicate when the acts of foreign
states and their agencies are not truly "sovereign.' 2 '
Marcos-Manotoc's default permitted the court to find that
Trajano's killing, though possible only because Marcos-Manotoc
enjoyed access to the state security apparatus by virtue of her official (or quasi-official) status, was ordered by Marcos-Manotoc in
her personal capacity and thus, was not attributable to the sovereign. 1 22 In reaching this conclusion, the court implicitly reconciled itself to the contradiction inherent in the Exparte Young and
may simultaneously act "under
Hafer fictions-that an official
23
color of law" and ultra vires.'
The flaw in Trajano is the court's failure to confront this contradiction directly. While many ATCA defendants do default,
others may choose to contest liability. If Chuidian's reading of
section 1603(b) of the FSIA is correct, all ATCA defendants sued
for human rights torts that require proof that the violator acted
under color of foreign law will be immune, having been able to
commit the torts in question only by exercising power delegated to
them by the sovereign. 1 24 Chuidian and Herbage insist that the
personal
fact that the official used his power abusively, to pursue
12 5
gratification or to commit "heinous" acts, is irrelevant.
Trajano is the first case to apply the Chuidian/Herbagerationale in the context of an ATCA case concerning gross human
rights violations. While its result is palatable, the reasoning of
the panel bodes ill for the future. The flaws in the interpretive
approach of Chuidian and Herbage must be confronted, and the
courts must either import a variant of the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity into ATCA litigation against foreign
officials or jettison the notion that individuals are "agencies and
instrumentalities" contemplated in section 1603(b) of the FSIA.
119 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
120 Id. at 717-19.
121 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), (5) (1988).
122 Trajano II, 978 F.2d at 498.
123 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157; Hafer, 112 S.Ct. at 363-64.
124 Chuidian,912 F.2d at 1107.
125 Id. at 1106; Herbage, 747 F. Supp. at 67.
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The 1992 enactment of the TVPA 126 makes resolution of this
confusion even more compelling. Only two violations of the law of
nations are actionable under the TVPA-torture and extrajudicial
killing. 127 Each specifically requires proof that the tortfeasor acted with actual or apparent authority or under color of foreign
law. Yet, under Chuidian and Herbage, such allegations would
automatically lead to dismissal on the pleadings, establishing the
"official" character of the individual defendant's conduct and cate1 28
gorically immunizing him from liability under the FSIA.
The drafters of the TVPA have offered confusing guidance as
to how it should be reconciled with the FSIA. The House Report

29

states that "[t]he TVPA is subject to restrictions in the For-

eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976" with respect to a foreign
state, its agency, or instrumentality. 30 The Report, however,
goes on immediately to state that "sovereign immunity would not
generally be an available defense."'
Instead, the Report explains that "nothing in the TVPA overrides the doctrines of diplomatic and head of state immunity. These doctrines would generally provide a defense to suits against foreign heads of state and
132
other diplomats visiting the United States on official business."
This is sensible and casts serious doubt on Chuidian. Numerous courts

33

and commentators

34

have continued to apply the

common-law doctrines of head of state and diplomatic immunity
since the enactment of the FSIA in 1976; for example, in Saltany
v. Reagan, 35 Prime Minister Thatcher asserted head of state im126 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., colloquy between Senators Specter and Grassley, 138 CONG. REC.
S2667-$2669 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992); H.R. REP. No. 102-367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
129 H.R. REP. No. 102-367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88.
130

Id. at 88.

Id.
Id.
133 See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State
Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 169, 171 (1986) (FSIA
"failed to establish guidelines for making immunity determinations for heads of state
.... [and] does not include immunity for heads of state"); Bass, supra note 21, at 30102 (noting that "despite the historical conflation of head of state and sovereign immunity, contemporary American practice treats nation-states and individual leaders as
distinct juridical entities" after enactment of FSIA).
135 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988), modified, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).
131
132
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munity while defendant United Kingdom relied upon its sovereign
immunity under the FSIA. 136 Since head of state immunity has
the disadvantage of requiring a "suggestion of immunity" by the
United States State Department, 137 it is difficult to see why
Thatcher and others similarly situated would rely upon the common-law doctrine rather than simply designating themselves "instrumentalities" of their foreign state. Recent commentators on
head of state immunity uniformly proceed under the assumption
that it remains a viable and distinct doctrine post-FSIA. 38 Yet of
all foreign state officials, who, if not the head of state, should enjoy the broadest scope of immunity based on an agency relationship with the sovereign? Furthermore, why should diplomats be
remitted to the complexities of diplomatic immunity' 3 9 rather
than the "absolute" protection of the FSIA as recognized in
140

Herbage?

The intended interaction of the TVPA and the FSIA is confused, however, by passages in the Senate Report' 4 ' and state-

ments of TVPA sponsor Senator Specter,' 42 asserting that foreign
officials would enjoy immunity under the FSIA if they had an
"agency relationship" with the sovereign. This "agency relationship" requires the state to "admit some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts."

43

The standard seems intended to exploit

the human rights hypocrisy of many foreign states which officially
condemn but nevertheless engage in practices of torture and summary execution. With respect to human rights violations by lowlevel officials, this "hypocrisy" exception to the FSIA may largely
suffice to drop the sovereign immunity barrier to ATCA or TVPA
suits.
Where the target of the suit is a policy-making official or a
former head of state, however, section 1603(b) of the FSIA (as interpreted in Chuidian) may pose more severe obstacles. For example, many of the allegations against Ferdinand Marcos concerned his tolerance for a pattern of human rights abuses
136
137
138
139

Id. at 320, 321 n.3.
Mallory, supra note 134, at 175-76.
Mallory, supra note 134, at 172-75; Bass, supra note 21, at 301-02.
See generally GRANT V. McCLANAHAN, DipLOwATIC h:MuNrrY (1989) (discuss-

ing various topics associated with diplomatic immunity).

140 Herbage, 747 F. Supp. at 67.
141 S. REP. No. 102-249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1991).
142 138 CONG. REC. S2667, 2668 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992).
143 Id.

514
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perpetrated by underlings without his direct involvement.A To
establish the command responsibility of such high-level officials,
plaintiffs must essentially prove that the actual policy of the government was encouragement of torture or summary execution.
The fact that the foreign government simultaneously criticized
human rights violations for public relations purposes has hitherto
not defeated plaintiffs' efforts to establish the complicity of highranking officers in cases such as Marcos145 and Forti v. Suarez46
Mason.1
Yet the same "knowledge or authorization" of human rights
abuses at the policy-making level that establishes the command
responsibility of high officials now apparently threatens to make
those cases nonjusticiable under the FSIA. Who is the "state" in
Senator Specter's vision? 1 47 As Justice Harlan cogently observed
a century ago, the "state" is incapable of action, including tortious
action, without the human agency of its officials.- 48 And the state
has no policies, either candid or hypocritical, explicit or de facto,
that are not made by human actors. In constitutional tort litigation, an official policy of rights violation serves to expand the scope
of liability. 1 49 Under the TVPA, a candid policy of human rights
violation would apparently extend foreign sovereign immunity
from the state to its officials.' 50
Perhaps this extension would come at a high cost to the state,
however. A ruling that a defendant official had an "agency relationship" with the state, and is thus immunized under section
See supra notes 46-53.
Marcos, MDL No. 840.
672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reconsiderationgranted in part, 694 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
147 See supra notes 142-43.
148 Young, 209 U.S. at 182-204 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149 See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
150 In Monroe v. Pape, Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent that suits against
state police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be permitted only upon a showing
that their conduct was authorized at least at the "custom and usage" level. 365 U.S.
167, 211-46 (1961). The majority ruled that proof of such a policy was not a prerequisite in a suit for damages against the individual officers. Id. at 183-87. Only where a
reasonable official in defendant's position would not have known the conduct in question was unconstitutional will the lawsuit fail-not because of sovereign immunity
but due to common-law official immunities presumed to survive the passage of § 1983.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The existence of rights-violating official policies might be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the conduct of
street-level officers. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (jury acquits
officer in killing of suspect but holds city liable for inadequate training in use of
deadly force).
144
145
146
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1603(b) of the FSIA, would also constitute a judicial finding that
the foreign state had an official policy of gross human rights violations. Such findings are often one of the key aims of litigants in
ATCA and TVPA cases.' 5 ' Under this scenario, the finding of systematic human rights violations would come at the outset of the
litigation, in the context of establishing jurisdiction, rather than
at the conclusion as has previously been the case.
Assuming that ATCA and TVPA litigants often want more
than this abstract vindication, however, further solutions should
be sought. First, the cases that have jumped to the conclusion
that all foreign officials are "agencies and instrumentalities" of
their sovereigns must be rejected. In many the rationale is palatable only because the results seem eminently reasonable, often because the actions challenged were clearly acts of state or because
the individuals sued had no contact with the United States. 52 Reliance on flawed and dangerous interpretations of the FSIA,
rather than more pertinent grounds for dismissal, is often a regrettable but remediable indication of the courts' unfamiliarity
with transnational litigation.
Second, the later enactment of the TVPA, and its clear anticipation that extraterritorial torts "under color of foreign law"
would be actionable against individual foreign officials, should be
taken to clarify that sovereign immunity of natural persons in
human rights cases should be the exception and not the rule. Because human rights received no attention in the drafting of the
FSIA, it is unreasonable to assume that the FSIA enacted a repeal
by implication of the ATCA for all but cases against non-state
actors.
Third, if there is to be presumptive inclusion of individual foreign officials within section 1603(b) of the FSIA, it must be made
subject to an exception analogous to that of Ex parte Young. Just
as state officials can never be delegated the power to violate the
Constitution, foreign officials can never be delegated the power to
torture, summarily execute, or commit violations of other jus
cogens norms, because the sovereign itself lacks the power to engage in such acts.
This leaves the problem of the apparent straightjacket of
Amerada Hess and its rejection of implicit exceptions to the FSIA.
See supra notes 54-55.
The opinion in Herbage mentions no contact between the defendant British
officials and the United States. 747 F. Supp. at 60.
151
152
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Why should thejus cogens nature of certain torts permit the creation of an implicit exception to the immunity of individual officials, when the grossness of Argentina's torture of Siderman 5 3
did
and the USSR's summary execution of Raoul Wallenberg'
not strip those states of sovereign immunity? "Easy"' answers
to these important questions are not available. Perhaps the
courts will accept the appropriateness of a more flexible approach
in light of the legislative history of the TVPA,' 5 6 which indicates a
Congressional intent to strike a fair balance between foreign sovereign immunity and the rights of human rights victims for judicial redress.
If an analogue to Ex parte Young were imported into ATCA
and TVPA litigation, the courts might further ponder analogies to
the official immunities doctrines that limit the liability of state
and federal officials sued for constitutional torts. Doctrines of
head of state or diplomatic immunity provide no protection for the
57
former officials who are the targets of human rights suits.'
While the question remains hypothetical, former foreign judges
might be given absolute immunity for violations committed in a
Police officials might be excused for commitjudicial capacity.'15
ting human rights violations in good faith ignorance of their illegality. 15 9 The grossness of the violations litigated to date make
these questions moot, but future cases might require their
consideration.
The Trajano opinion, while intelligent and careful, provides
an unsatisfactory resolution of the FSIA issue. Given the muddle
in the legislative history of the TVPA,- 60 one is cautious about
seeking clarification of section 1603(b) from Congress. But if the
courts continue down the ill-conceived Chuidian path there may
be no alternative. The future viability of both the ATCA and the
TVPA depends on the clear recognition of at least some form of
153 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
154 Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
155 Trajano II, 978 F.2d at 498.
156 See supra notes 128-32, 141-43.
157 See Bass, supra note 21.
158 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
159 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (limiting scope of qualified
good faith immunity); Wood v Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (recognizing that officials are entitled to qualified good faith immunity from liability for damages).
160 See supra notes 128-32, 141-43 and accompanying text.
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of human
ultra vires exception to immunity for gross violations
16

rights by foreign officials acting under color of law.
IV. DoE v

KRADZiC -

THE FUTURE OF THE ALIEN TORT

CLAins AcT?

In February 1993 the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a
class action suit under the ATCA and the TVPA against Radovan
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, and served him with process at
a New York hotel. 162 Shortly thereafter, several other plaintiffs
represented by Catherine MacKinnon and the National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund served process
on Karadzic in a separate suit. 6 3 Karadzic had been admitted to
6
as an alien in transit to the
the United States on a C-2 visa'1
United Nations, to participate in the UN-sponsored peace talks on
Bosnia. Karadzic did not enter on a diplomatic visa, since he is
of
not an official of any recognized state, but instead is the leader
65
leadership.'
elected
Bosnia's
battling
an insurgent group
Karadzic has been accused of masterminding the program of
ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims through gross human
rights and humanitarian law violations, including arbitrary killings of civilians, systematic rape, enforced prostitution, and forced
pregnancy. 166 The Acting Secretary of State publicly labelled
for these
Karadzic ai 67war criminal because of his responsibility
While Karadzic might be considered a leading candiatrocities .

date for prosecution in the war crimes proceedings before the International Tribunal established by the United Nations Security
161 Codification of ajus cogens exception to the immunity of states might also be

considered, though graver "floodgates" and friction concerns might be raised than in
the context of suits against individuals found in the United States. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrierto Human Rights Litigation-IsAmendment Necessary or Possible?,86 PRocs. AMr. Soc. IN'L L. 338 (1992).

Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1993).
Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 2, 1993).
28 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C) (1988) ("an alien who qualifies as a person entitled
to pass in transit to and from the United Nations Headquarters District").
3, 6.
165 Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878
162
163
164

166 See AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL,

BosNiA-HEasEGovINA: GROSS

ABUSES OF

BASIc

HuiAN RIGHTS 7 (1992); Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/S-2/1, U.N.
(1992) (condemning practice of "ethnic cleansing" and "recogDoc.
nizingE/CN.4/1992/S-2/6
that Serbian leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear
primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice.").
167 See War Crimes in the FormerYugoslavia, U.S. Report to the UN Security
STATE DISPATCH 721, 732 (Sept. 1992).

Council, 3 U.S. DEPT. OF
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Council, 168 the course of the war in Bosnia will likely determine
whether he enjoys impunity from criminal process.
The complaints against Karadzic allege specific acts of arbitrary killing, rape, and arbitrary detention concerning the plaintiffs, who are now refugees. 169 The Doe plaintiffs are alleged to
represent a class of all persons who are victims of war crimes and
human rights violations in Bosnia by forces under Karadzic's
control. 170
The cases against Karadzic present an important opportunity
for development of the ATCA and the TVPA. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Linder v. Calero Portocarrero,71 there is no "foreign
civil war exception" to the norms against torture and arbitrary
killing. Nevertheless, the context of ongoing conflict and the class
action nature of the Doe complaint, sweeping in all breaches of
humanitarian and human rights law attributable to Karadzic, are
likely to raise concerns about judicial "intrusion" into the arena of
politics.
Yet, the greatest symbolic value of the Karadzic suits may be
precisely their audacity. The Bosnian conflict has been a terrible
ordeal not only for the many victims of the war and genocidal policies. It has been a severe trial for the system for international
protection of human rights and enforcement of humanitarian
norms-a trial the international system has so far failed. Despite
invocation of new and innovative mechanisms for the protection of
human rights, including special sessions of the Commission on
Human Rights;1 72 fact-finding missions from that body as well as

168 Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203
(1993). Article 7(3) of the proposed statute of the International Tribunal, drafted by
the Secretary-General, provides that a superior is personally responsible for war
crimes "if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof;" Article 7(2) provides that the official position of an accused person, including a head of state, neither
relieves the person of criminal responsibility nor mitigates punishment. Report of the
Secretary-GeneralPursuantto paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704 para. 59 (1993).
169 Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878 IT 7-8.
170 Id. IT 9-14.
171 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992) (avoiding jurisdictional issues of international
law by allowing claims under Florida tort law).
172 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/S-2/1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/
S-2/6 (1992).
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the European Community1 7 3 and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe; and creation of the United Nations War
Crimes Commission and International Tribunal, 174 no one has
been punished or authoritatively held responsible.
The service of the complaints on Karadzic provided the first
occasion on which he has been called to account for his gross violations of fundamental norms. His shocked response to the complaints1 75 indicates that they have already served one of the key
purposes of ATCA and TVPA litigation-to convey to the torturers
and killers that they have no safe haven from responsibility for
their crimes in the United States, though they may be granted
17 6
impunity elsewhere.
Karadzic's threat not to return to New York without a grant
of immunity 1 77 will attract the concern of ATCA skeptics. Why,
they may ask, should the rights of an individual or even a class of
human rights victims be given judicial protection in United States
courts, if such suits create a risk of upsetting the negotiation process that might end the war? In the Klinghoffer case, 1 78 the district and circuit courts grappled with a related issue-given the
importance of the PLO's presence in New York for the purpose of
participating in the work of the United Nations, should its presence in New York be burdened by exposure to suit for acts of extraterritorial terrorism in which the PLO is alleged to be
complicit?
These questions are best resolved not by a mechanical invocation of the political question doctrine' 7 9 nor by rejecting the legitimacy of ATCA suits in all circumstances, but by careful application of established immunities doctrines and jurisdictional
173

at A10.

20,000 Muslim Women Raped in Bosnia, EC Says, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1993,

174 U.N. Docs. A/47/666 - S/24809; E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 and E/CN.41992/S-1110
(1992); Legal Commission to Start Investigation of Mass Graves in FormerYugoslavia, Agence France Presse, Dec. 14, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis library, AFP file;
CSCE Considers Yugoslav War Crimes Trial, Agence France Presse, Dec. 15, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, AFP file.
175 Paul Lewis, Immunity Sought for Bosnian Serb, N.Y. TI~ms, Feb. 23, 1993, at
AS.
176 See supra notes 54-55.
177 Lewis, supra note 175.
178 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991); Klinghoffer v.
S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 795 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
179 Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49 (observing that doctrine "restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to
which authority to make that judgment has been constitutional[ly] commit[ted]").
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principles such as minimum contacts and forum non conveniens.
Karadzic seeks an exercise of judicial creativity to fashion for him
a new form of fimctional immunity, for those admitted to the
United States solely for the purpose of conducting UN business of
a "diplomatic" sort.'8 0 Under the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement, Karadzic is entitled at best to immunity from arrest,
not immunity from civil suit.1 8 ' Assuming that his physical presence in New York suffices to establish personal jurisdiction, 8 2 the
case cannot be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. A claim of
forum non conveniens would obviously fail, given the victims' lack
of access to effective judicial remedies at the situs of the torts.
The international legal definitions of torture and arbitrary
killing require proof of tortious action with actual or apparent authority or under color of foreign law.'8 3 For Karadzic and others
like him, this requires proof that his acts are attributable to a sovereign, in this case Serbia through its various forms of support for
Karadzic and his military forces. These state responsibility issues
resemble those encountered in assessing the acts of "death
squads" and other quasi-state actors. Yet the more Karadzic is
seen as an agent of the Milosevic government in Serbia, the more
weighty his claims to diplomatic or sovereign immunity.
Alternatively, Karadzic can be sued for torts committable by
non-state actors under norms of humanitarian law and terrorism.
While the ATCA can serve as a vehicle for such claims, Judge Edwards's opinion in Tel-Oren sounds a cautionary note.18 4 The
preference of the Eleventh Circuit to limit Linder's claims against
the Nicaraguan contra leaders to those derived from Florida tort
law in preference to humanitarian law' additionally signals judicial reluctance.

180 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss before Answer, Doe v.
Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 878 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 10, 1993) at 6-7.
181 Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 61 Stat. 3416, T.I.A.S. No. 1676,
11(2) U.N.T.S. 11, entered intoforce, Nov. 21, 1947, Article III Section 9(a), Article IV
Section 11.
182 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (transient presence in
state sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction).
183 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
184 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
185 Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992).
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CONCLUSION

The jury trial of the consolidated Marcos suits and the Ninth
Circuit's decision of Imee Marcos-Manotoc's appeal in Trajano are
important milestones in litigation brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. This two-hundred-year-old statute is beginning to
achieve its full flowering not only as a vehicle for vindicating the
rights of victims of extreme tortious conduct but also as an emblem of United States commitment to respect for principles of customary international law and faithful provision of judicial remedies for its breach, despite the cynicism, indifference, or impotence
of other states and international institutions. While class action
ATCA suits present new dilemmas for human rights lawyers,
these dilemmas are not markedly different from those faced by
other lawyers involved in public interest or institutional reform
litigation. The recently-filed ATCA suits against Radovan
Karadzic, concerning gross human rights and humanitarian law
violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, present both a beacon of hope
and a challenging opportunity to advance understanding of the
ATCA and its role in the system for international protection of
human rights.

